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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XXVIII NOVEMBER, 1942 NUMBER I
RECENT STEPS IN GOVERNMENT REGULATION
OF BUSINESS
GEORGE JARviS THOMPSON
This survey will endeavor to gauge some of the more important advances
in both state and federal government regulation of business, and, so far as
possible, to point out the significant trends in that respect as they are develop-
ing beneath the supervening wartime regulation. It will be seen that regu-
lation by the federal government continues to advance chiefly along two
lines-the commerce power and the financial power, the latter taking the form
of federal grants or loans.
At -the outset it may be well to note that last year in Olse.n. z,. Nebraska
the reconstructed Supreme Court of the United States specifically overruled
that bulwark of the old constitutionalism, Rebnik v. McBride,2 to uphold
state regulation of fees and charges of employment agencies. This is the
first direct scotching of the "affected with a public interest" line of cases of
the doughty old quintet of the court, and, in view of the Nebbia case's 3 earlier
repudiation of the basic premise, is significant now chiefly as a demonstration
that the new era of constitutional doctrine marches.
4
Transportation and Commerce
In the fields of transportation and commerce the Transportation Act of
1313 U. S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 133 A. L. R. 1500 (1941), Notes (1942) 10 GEO.
WASEH. L. REv. 880; (1942) 40 Micr. L. IEv. 743; (1941) 20 N. CAR. L. REv. 83.
2277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 56 A. L. R. 1327 (1928).3Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 89 A. L. R. 1469 (1934).
See Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Iebbia v. New
York (1934) 34 COL. L. REv. 401.
In Kelly-Sullivan v. Moss, 174 Misc. 1098, 22 N. Y. S. (2d) 491 (Sup. Ct. 1940),
aff'd without opinion, 260 App. Div. 921, 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 984 (1st Dep't 1940), Notes
(1940) 9 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 242; (1941) 19 N. Ca L. Rav. 212; a New York statute
regulating charges of ticket brokers to 75 cents on each ticket was upheld on the ground
that the Nebbia case had, in effect, though not explicitly, overruled Tyson v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 58 A. L. R. 1236 (1927), in which similar New York
legislation had been held unconstitutional.4 For a risumd of the new constitutionalism, see Kennedy, The Bethlehem Steel Case-
A Test of the New Constitntionl lsm I (1942) 11 FORDHA-M L. Rr~v. 133. Also see,
Albertsworth, The New Constitutionalism (1940) 26 A. B. A. J. 865; Rottschaefer, The
Constitution and a Planned Economy (1940) 38 MicH. L. Rav. 1133; Hamilton, Special
Competence of the Supreme Court (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 1319; CORWIN, CO NSTIrrUrIONAL
REVOLuTio, LTD. (1941).
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1940 declared a national transportation policy designed to provide fair and
impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the Interstate
Commerce Act, including therein for the first time interstate common and
contract carriers by water, "to the end of developing, coordinating and pre-
serving a national transportation system by water, highway, and rail, as well
as other means, adequate to meet the needs of the United States, of the Postal
Service, and of the national defense."-5 The phrase, "as well as other means,"
may point the way to further coordination with air transportation when
that latest transportation medium comes into its own in the post-war era.
In bringing under unified regulation these heretofore fiercely competitive land
and water carriers, the Act seeks to guard against favoritism by stipulating
that the regulation be so administered as to recognize and preserve the ad-
vantages of each type of transportation.7
Recent regulatory development in this field is characterized by apparently
divergent viewpoints of the Congress and of the United States Supreme
Court as to the desirability of further extending the Shreveport doctrine
permitting regulation of intrastate transportation by federal administrative
bodies so far as deemed necessary to eliminate discrimination against and
554 STAT. 952, 49 U. S. C. note preceding § 1.6See Cushman, Independent Regulatory Commissions, pp. 403 at 404 et seq., 415-6. See
also Smith, infra note 7.7The statute further directed the President to appoint a special Board of Investigation
and Research. T"NSPORTATioN AcT 1940, § 302 (a) and (b), Title III, Part I (54 STAT.
952, 49 U. S. C. c. I, Introductory note).
The function of the Board, as stated in U. S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, Fall, 1942, 418,
is "to make investigations of transportation problems and to report its conclusions
and recommendations as to national transportation policy to the President and to Con-
gress. Under the statute the Board is directed to investigate and report upon the fol-
lowing subjects:
"1. The relative economy and fitness of railroad, motor vehicle, and water carriers
for transportation service, in order to determine the type of service for which each form
of carrier is particularly fitted or unfitted, and the methods by which each form of
carrier can and should be developed so that there may be provided a national trans-
portation system adequate for the needs of commerce, the Postal Service, and the
national defense.
"2. The extent to which these carriers are the beneficiaries of public aid, through
grants of property or funds, extension of credit, or other means, in excess of adequate
compensation to [from?] the public.
"3. The extent to which these carriers are taxed by Federal, State, and local govern-
mental units.
"The Board is further authorized to investigate or consider any other matters relating
to railroad, motor vehicle, or water carriers which it deems important to investigate for
the improvement of transportation conditions and to effectuate the national transporta-
tion policy declared in the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended."
See address by Nelson Lee Smith, Chairman of the Board of Investigation and Re-
search, "The New Transportation Board and Its Work" (1942) 9 I. C. C. PRACTI-
TIONERS' J. 552.
The existence of the Board was extended by Presidential Proclamation June 26, 1942,
to September 18, 1944.
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other adverse effects of state regulation upon interstate commerce.8 The
Congress expressly provided against the application of this doctrine in the
Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935,9 and as to water carriers in the Trans-
portation Act of 1940.10 On the other hand, the Supreme Court recently
applied the doctrine in two cases: (1) to uphold power of the Secretary of
Agriculture to fiyx minimum prices for milk produced and distributed within
a single state where the state prices tended to compete with those fixed by
the federal government in interstate commerce;11 and (2) to sustain the
paramount authority of the Federal Power Commission to grant a certificate
of public convenience and necessity to a natural gas pipe line company
seeking to engage solely in wholesale intrastate distribution of natural gas
bought from an interstate pipe line corporation because of the buyer's ability
to obstruct the stream of interstate commerce. 12 This last case also illustrates
8Houston, East & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342, 34 Sup. Ct. 833
(1914). By § 416 Transportation Act of 1920 adding § 13 (4) to the Interstate Com-
merce Act [49 U. S. C. § 13 (4)] the Commission was given power to remove unjust
discrimination by intrastate rates against interstate commerce by prescribint minimum
intrastate rates. The constitutionality of this legislation was upheld in Railroad Comm.
of Wis. v. Chicago, B & Q R.R., 257 U. S. 563, 42 Sup. Ct. 232, 22 A. L. R. 1086(1922) ; New York v. United States, 257 U. S. 591, 42 Sup. Ct. 239 (1922) ; United
States v. Louisiana, 290 U. S. 70, 54 Sup. Ct. 28 (1933).
949 STAT. 543, 49 U. S. C. 301 et seq., I. C. A. Part II § 201 et seq.
1054 STAT. 931, I. C. A. Part III, § 303 (k), 49 U. S. C. § 903 (k), reads, "Nothing
in this chapter shall authorize the Commission to prescribe or regulate any rate, fare,
or charge for intrastate transportation, or for any service connected therewith for the
purpose of removing discrimination against interstate commerce or for any other
purpose."
But Congress did resort to the Shreveport or adverse competition doctrine in the
Bituminous Coal Act of 1937. See infra note 67.
11United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 62 Sup. Ct. 523 (1942),
Notes, (1942) 42 COL. L. REv. 694; (1942) 40 MIcHa. L. REV. 694; (1942) 20 TEX. L.
REv. 612; (1942) 8 U. OF PiTT. L. Rxv. 139.
The Wrightwood Dairy Company was a milk handler in the Chicago area which pur-
chased all its milk from state producers and sold only to local consumers, so there was
no intermingling of this local milk with milk from without the state. The case required
the defendant to comply with the terms of U. S. Secretary of Agriculture's Order No.
41, fixing minimum prices to be paid producers for milk which "is in the current of
interstate or foreign commerce, or directly burdens, obstructs, or affects interstate or
foreign commerce in such commodity or product thereof.' The Court said the legisla-
tive history indicated the purpose of Congress to exercise the interstate commerce power
to the full extent in this field.
For a converse case enforcing state minimum price of milk in sale to United States
Army Camp, see infra note 20.
This is a logical extension of the power of the federal government to fix prices of
goods sold in interstate commerce recently recognized in United States v. Rock Royal
Co-operative, 307 U. S. 533, 59 Sup. Ct. 993 (1939) as to milk, and Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1941) as to coal.
See upholding state minimum price milk regulation as to sales to federal government,
infra note 20.
12Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 314 U. S. 498, 62
Sup. Ct. 384 (1942), Notes (1942) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 399; (1942) 30 ILL. BAR. J. 250,
reversing the Illinois Supreme Court which had upheld the State Public Service Coin-
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that federal legislative regulation of intrastate business is wafting further
and further on the stream-of-commerce theory applied in the famous National
Labor Relations Board cases upholding federal regulation of the right to
collective bargaining with respect to manufacturing businesses and public
utilities located entirely within one state.'3 An important case in this de-
velopment, one resorting to both the stream-of-commerce and the compe-
tition theories, is United States v. Darby,14 decided last year. That case
sustained the constitutionality of the Federal Fair: Labor Standards Act' 5 as
applied to prohibit movement in interstate commerce of goods manufactured
wholly intrastate, but under substandard labor conditions as defined by the
Act, when intended or expected to move in whole or in part in interstate
commerce according to the normal course of business-and this, though the
goods, lumber and- its products, were in no way deleterious in themselves
nor frowned upon by state law. The court pointed out :15 "The motive and
purpose of the present regulation is plainly to make effective the congressional
conception of public policy that interstate commerce should not be made the
instrument of competition in the distribution of goods produced under sub-
standard labor conditions, which competition is injurious to the commerce
and to the states from and to which the commerce flows."'16 Broad as the
doctrine of the Darby case may seem to be, it was markedly extended in the
late case of Kirschbaum v. Wallingh 7 to sustain the application of the Fair
mission in requiring said intrastate wholesale natural gas corporation to procure a state
certificate of public convenience and necessity, now declared unnecessary.
'
3National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57Sup. Ct. 615, 108 A. L. R. 1352 (1937), and related cases collected and discussed in(1937) 22 CORNELL L. Q. 568; and Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upon
the Development of Collective Bargaining (1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 1071, at 1101-4.
14312 U. S. 100, 61 Sup. Ct. 451, 132 A. L. R. 1430 (1941). Also see Opp Cotton
Mills v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 61 Sup. Ct. 524 (1941) likewise sustaining the
wage-hour law.
1552 STAT. 1060, 29 U. S. C. § 201 et seq.
15312 U. S. at 115, 61 Sup. Ct. at 457 (1941).
16Contrast the statement of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Kirschbaum case infra
note 17, 62 Sup. Ct. at 1120: "Moreover, in one of its intermediate stages, the measure[FLSA] incorporated the Shreveport doctrine, . . . in that it was specifically made
applicable to intrastate production which competed with goods produced in another
state. S. 2475, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., as recommitted Dec. 17, 1937, § 8 (a). But, as
reported by the House Committee on Labor, this provi~ion was deleted. S. 2475, supra,
as reported April 21, 1938; See H. Rep. 2182, supra."
17 Kirschbaum v. Walling, - U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1116, 1120 (1942). Roberts, J.,
dissented.
The United States Supreme Court has refused to review a decision holding that an ice
manufacturing company which made and sold its product within one state to interstate
railroads for use as a refrigerant of foods in operation of interstate trains was subject
to said wage-hour law (FLSA). Hamlet Ice Co., Inc. v. Walling, 127 F. (2d) 165(C. C. A. 4th 1942). This trend to extend the coverage of the Act was carried to the point
of holding an employer subject to its provisions though unaware that the goods produced
were transshipped into interstate commerce. Cullum v. Stevens, 5 Wage & Hour Rep.
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Labor Standards Act to engineers, firemen, elevator men, porters, janitors,
carpenters, and similar employees of a landlord engaged solely in the operation
and maintenance of a loft building, the tenants of which produced large
quantities of goods for interstate commerce. The general objective of "the
New Constitutionalism" in this field was distinctly revealed by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the Court, when he announced as the basis of deci-
sion "the statutory definition of employees 'engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce', construed as the provision inust be in
the cointext of the history of federal absorption of governmental authority
over industrial enterprise."'17 [Italics supplied.]
In the Darby case the Court again emphasized that, "It is no objection
to the assertion of the power to regulate interstate commerce that its exercise
is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise of the police
power of the states." ' Does this emphasis signify the beginning of the sup-
304, 46 Fed. Supp. 73 (N. D. Tex. 1942), approved in Note (1942) 56 HiRv. L R-v. 1139.
For a rdsume of cases on the basic issue of what is commerce within the FLSA, see
Note (1942) 90 U. or PA. L. RZv. 842. (Interstate Commerce and the Fair 'Labor
Standard Act of 1938.)
See Overnight Motor Transportation Co. v. Missel, - U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1216
(1942), upholding application of overtime wage and liquidated damage provisions of
ELSA in favor of interstate motor common carrier's employee who acted as a rate
clerk and performed other incidental duties, none of which were connected with safety
of operation. Roberts, J., dissented.
On the other hand, Walling v. A. H. Belo Corporation, - U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct.
1223 (1942), held that since there is nothing in the Act which bars an employer from
contracting with his employees to pay them the same wages after the Act became effec-
tive that they received previously, so long as that rate equals or exceeds the minimum
required by the Act, such mutually satisfactory rate may be deemed the regular rate
of pay for the purpose of measuring the time-and-a-half pay for overtime work. Reed,
Black, Douglas and Murphy, JJ., dissented on the ground that the employment con-
tract contained a guaranty clause of $40 for a 5412 hour week, which was in excess
of the statutory maximum hours for a work week, and modified the full operation of
the time-and-a-half overtime clause of the wage contract in a way inimical to the opera-
tion of the statute.
1711 U. S. - at -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1116 at 1120.
As this issue goes to press, the epoch-making decision of Wickard v. Filburn,
- U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 82 (1942), has been handed down, by a -unanimous court,
holding that the commerce power supported the imposition of a federal penalty on
a farmer for wheat grown on his own farm for home consumption in excess of
his farm quota under the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 152 STAT. 31, 7 U. S. C.
§ 1281 et seq., as amended 1941, 55 STAT. 203, 7 U. S. C. (Supp. No. 1) § 1340],
though said excess wheat was definitely not intended, expected, or believed destined for
movement in interstate commerce. The case is significant in extending the federal
commerce power to govern marketing as well as production and transportation of a
basic agricultural commodity, and the regulation of demand as well as supply. It car-
ries the adverse-effect theory to the point that the possessor of home-grown excess wheat
violates that policy in that he deprives the national market of a potential consumer.
Further, said excess, though grown for home use, added to the national oversupply of
wheat, thus potentially tending to defeat the purpose of Congress in maintaining a
nation-wide reasonable price wheat market.
18312 U. S. at 114, 61 Sup. Ct. at 457. See Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U. S.
510, 514, 36 Sup. Ct. 190 (1916) ; United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
311 U. S. 377, 427, 61 Sup. Ct. 291 (1940).
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planting of state police power areas by a pseudo-delegated federal police
power? Consider the 5-4 decision in Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson,9
decided last February. It was there held that certain sections of the federal
Internal Revenue Code, defining process or renovated butter, fixing a pound-
age. tax thereon and empowering the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate
the inspecting, storage, and marketing thereof, superseded the state police
power to seize and condemn such materials brought into the state in inter-
state commerce., Only a small part of the butter stock there involved was
destined for shipment to other states, but the Court took the view that the state
act was impliedly superseded by the federal act, although the latter made no
provision for seizure and condemnation. Even Chief Justice Stone, who has
pushed far the extension of federal regulation, was disturbed, and dissented
on the ground that federal legislation should not be held lightly to override
state police power statutes, particularly where, as here, these statutes might
properly be construed to supplement the Congressional action by providing
for the seizure and condemnation which the federal statute omitted.20 On
the other hand, in California v. Thoizpson,21 state regulation which required
licenses for travel bureaus and agencies arranging for interstate transporta-
tion of passengers for hire by automobile was upheld in spite of the Federal
Motor Carrier Act. This wag on the grounds that the federal act had not
wholly superseded state regulation since it expressly excepted casual or
occasional travel, the type of transportation involved, and, also, since the
state act applied equally to interstate and intrastate transportation. This
decision by Chief Justice Stone specifically overruled DiSanto v. Pennsyl-
'9315 U. S. 148, 62 Sup. Ct. 491 (1942). Criticized in Note (1942) 28 VA. L. REv. 822
as an unwarranted extension of "supersedure without conflict."
20Compare Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U. S. 1, 62 Sup. Ct. 43 (1941), Notes
(1941) 40 MIcH. L. Rsv. 457; (1941) 28 VA. L. Ray. 251, 278, from the same state,
in which the court greatly narrowed the constitutional immunity of the United States
by upholding the state sales tax as assessed against a contractor engaged in building
an army cantonment on a cost plus basis even though said tax increasing the cost was
by the terms of the contract passed on directly to the federal government.
What will the court say of the conflict of immunities of the federal and state govern-
ments in such a case as Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm., - Pa. Super. -, 24 A.
(2d) 717 (1942), Note (1942) 90 U. OF PA. L. Rsv. 966, upholding Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission's minimum price on milk sold to the United States Army, Indian-
town Cap Military Reservation, in the face of federal statutes requiring such govern-
ment contracts to be let only on competitive bids?
Perhaps this will be answered in the review granted by the United States Supreme
Court of Pacific Coast Dairy, Inc. v. Dep't of Agriculture of California, 19 Cal. (2d)
818, 123 P. (2d) 442 (1942), which sustained application of state minimum price as to
milk sold to a United States Government military post.
21313 U. S. 109, 61 Sup. Ct. 930 (1941), Note (1941) 27 VA. L. Rv. 1095. For the
conflict on the validity of state regulation of travel bureau agents under the police
power, see Note (1942) 30 GEoRGorowN L. J. 404, approving Ex parte Garland, 32 Tex.
Cr. Rep. 36, 154 S. W. (2d) 834 (1941), which denied the right of state regulation
because said business was both innocent and private. Sed quaeret
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vania,22 which had denied the constitutionality of state legislation requiring
a license for selling steamship tickets to or from foreign countries, thereby
giving effect to his own dissenting opinion in the latter case. The Transpor-
tation Act of 1940, however, has amended the Federal Motor Carrier Act
to bring within its coverage such casual or reciprocal transportation of
persons or property when offered, furnished, or arranged for by a broker,
as in the above case, thus superseding the state power when and to the-
extent it is made effective.23
Transmission of Natural Gas and Electricity
The commerce clause also has been used to extend government regulation
through the Federal Power Commission over the interstate transportation of
natural gas and transmission of electric energy for sale at wholesale to
local distributing public utilities under the. 1935 amendment to the Federal
Power Act 24 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938.25 While, by the terms of
these Acts, Congress voluntarily has refrained from undertaking to regulate
either local production or local distribution of electric energy or natural gas,
this may furnish but a temporary respite, since in the light of the recent
stream-of-commerce cases previously mentioned; there seems no constitu-
tional obstacle to complete federal regulation when desired.26 Perhaps a sig-
nificant straw on the pathway to the future is the exemption of all forms of
governmental enterprises engaged in such interstate transmission and sale of
electricity. To meet the immediate mischief which called it into being, the
Electric Act carefully provided that federal regulation should extend only to
matters not subject to state regulation.2 7  Rather surprisingly, it also ex-
22273 U. S. 34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267 (1927). Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone, JJ., dissented.
231. C. A. Part II § 203 (9); 49 U. S. C. 303 (9) as amended 1940, 54 STAT. 921.
By order of March 21, 1942, the I. C. C. extended its Motor Carrier regulation over
this area in part, but the effective date thereof was postponed to Nov. 1, 1942. EX parte
No. M.C.-35, 11 U. S. LAw WEEIC, § 2, p. 2030 (July 14, 1942).
2416 U. S. C. § 824 et seq.
2515 U. S. C. § 717 et seq. See Preston, Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry
(1939) 45 W. VA. L. Q. 250.2 6May an entering wedge have been Chief Justice Stone's prominent citation in the
recent Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., supra note 12, of
Pennsylvania Gas Co. v. Public Service Comm. of N. Y., 252 U. S. 23, 40 Sup. Ct. 279
(1920), holding interstate transmission of natural gas continued to the consumer's burner
tip though that case was supposed to have been largely supplanted by East Ohio Gas Co.
v. Tax Comm. of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465, 51 Sup. Ct. 499 (1931), Note (1931) 41 YALE
L. J. 304. The latter case declared that the interstate character of natural gas trans-
mission'ceased when the pressure was stepped down and the gas turned into local sys-
tems of distribution, and expressly disapproved the doctrine of the Pennsylvania Gas
case. See Note (1942) 27 Coiuxr. L. Q. at 402.2 7TPublic Utilities Commission of Rhode Island v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co., 273
U. S. 83, 47 Sup. Ct. 294 (1927). See, for the former situation, Howard, Gas and
Electricity in Interstate Commerce (1934) 18 M INk. L. REv. 611, 683.
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empted all existing lawful state regulation of exportation of hydro-electric
energy across a' state line.28 In addition, there is the provision jn the old
Federal Power Act, now Part 1,29 for temporary use by the government of
navigable water licensee power projects, for the purpose of manufacturing
nitrates, explosives, or munitions of war or for any other purpose involving
the national safety upon payment of just compensation. The Power Act of
1935, regulating electric utility companies engaged in interstate commerce,
envisaged a permanent program to this end. It expressly charged the Federal
Power Commission, in order to assure an abundant supply of electric energy
throughout the United States, to divide the country into regional districts
for the voluntary interconnection and co-ordination of facilities for the gen-
eration, transmission and sale of electric energy, subject to reasonable oppor-
tunity for each state commission to present its views and recommendations.3
It is fortunate these acts were passed before the present war era, as it pre-
pared the power industry to meet the present-day need by providing for
temporary connection and exchange of facilities and service as between
electric transmission enterprises both within and without the jurisdiction of
the commission in such a way as will best meet the emergency and serve
the public interest.
The Rural Electrification Administration is another and most active chan-
nel for spreading government regulation within the states.31 One of the
most successful of the New Deal experiments, the R.E.A. entered an almost
wholly undeveloped field of great economic and social possibilities with a
10-year program based on a loan fund of hundreds of millions of dollars. 32
2816 U. S. C. § 824. The wording of this exemption indicates that Congress takes
over, however, all subsequent regulation of exportation of hydro-electric energy to other
states. The Act (§ 824-a) expressly confers on the Federal Power Commission the
regulation of the transmission of electric energy to a foreign country. For a discussion
of United States Supreme Court cases upholding state taxation on natural gas and
electric power destined for export to other states, see, Howard, loc. cit. supra note 27
at 696 et seq.
2916 U. S. C. § 809. In United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra
note 18, it was held that waters capable of becoming navigable by improvements are
subject to national planning and control in the broad regulation of commerce granted to
the federal government; therefore, a hydro-electric corporation wishing to erect a dam
thereon must get a license fiom the Federal Power Commission.
3016 U. S. C. § 824 (a). For a discussion of the effect of the extensive formation of
regions for federal administrative purposes on the traditional distribution of govern-
mental power between the nation and state, see Fesler, Federal Use of Administration
Areas (1940) 207 THE ANNALS, Ar. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. SCIENcE 111. The subject
of this volume of the ANNALS is, "Intergovernmental Relations in the United States."31First established by executive order, May, 1935, and later made an independent
agency by the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U. S. C. § 901 et seq.; 49 STAT.
1363), it was transferred to the Department of Agriculture by the Government Reorgani-
zation Plan, No. II, July 1, 1939.32The original Act provided a loan fund of $400,000,000 to be expended at the rate
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The result is that with electricity available to some 10% of the farms of the
country in 1934, it has now been brought to nearly 35% of them.33
The R.E.A. functions in three ways: (1) by lending funds to finance rural
electrification; (2) by line building; and (3) by activities designed to pro-
tect the government's investment. There are no grants of funds, but only
loans, either to build a system, or to furnish consumer equipment and appli-
ances.3 4 These loans are not made to individuals but to public utilities,35
public bodies and cooperatives, preference being given to public sponsored or
cooperative enterprises. The federal program has exerted considerable influ-
ence on private utilities by stimulating renewed interest in this type of service,
resulting in sharply accelerated utility construction in rural areas, and by
demonstrating on a large scale the practicability of less expensive but fully
adequate types of line construction and equipment for rural service. The
chief development, however, has been through rural electric cooperatives or-
ganized under state laws.
Up to this year, New York had enacted no special rural electric coopera-
tive law, but merely authorized public bodies to accept federal aid to meet
the depression emergency. New York, together with New Jersey and five
other states, has been among the small minority regulating R.E.A. coopera-
tives as public utilities.30  Many states, particularly in the deep south, have
adopted cooperative statutes drawn by the R.E.A., which not only exempt
those cooperatives from local public utility commission regulation, but ab-
jectly abdicate to federal regulation. Thus, the Rural Electrification Author-
ity Act of Tennessee 37 empowers this newly created type of public corpora-
tion to contract with "any federal agency," defined as "the United States of
of $40,000,000 a year. The success of the project led to an advance by the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation of $100,000,000 additional in 1939, and $60,000,000 additional for
the years 1941 and 1942, and $10,000,000 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943.33See U. S. GOVERNMENTAL MANUAL, Fall, 1942, p. 318; R. E. A. REPORT, 1941, p. 1.3 4 System loans must not only be reasonably secured, but must be self-liquidating and
amortized over a maximum period of 25 years; whereas wiring and appliance loans
must be amortized within 5 years. Interest is charged at rates paid by the United
States on specified long-term indebtedness, averaging a little less than 3%. See U. S.
GOVERNMENTAL MANUAL, Fall, 1942, p. 318; R. E. A. REPORT, 1940, p. 4; and 7 U. S. C.
§§ 904, 905.3 5 The New York State Gas & Electric Corporation has been aided in rural electrifica-
tion in southern central New York by R.E.A. See R. E. A. REPORT, 1940, Table 4, p. 44.3 0 The other five states were Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Virginia, and West Vir-
ginia. R. E. A. REPORT, 1941, p. 15. Some of these states have modified the Commis-
sion jurisdiction. See infra note 39.3 7 TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§ 3708.26 et seq., at § 3708.27 (10). Going
even further is the Virginia Electric Cooperatives Act, 1936, § 3 (i) defining "Federal
Agency" to mean "the United States of America, Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Federal Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration and any and all other
authorities, agencies, and instrumentalities of the United States of America, heretofore
or hereafter created."
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America, the President of the United States, Tennessee Valley Authority, the
Public Works Administration, and any and all other authorities, agencies
and instrumentalities of the United States of America." The Act further
empowered such cooperatives, "in connection with such contract to stipulate
and agree to such covenants, .terms and conditions as the governing body
may deem appropriate, including, but without limitations, covenants, terms
and conditions with respect to resale -rates, financing and accounting meth-
ods, services, operation and maintenance practices and manner of disposing
of the revenues."38 A few states, while following the Tennessee statute in
general, have preserved some jurisdiction in the state public utilities com-
mission. 39 Most states have granted these R.E.A. cooperatives extensive tax
exemption too. The New York Rural Electric Cooperative Law of 194240
goes far in substituting a $10 "license fee in lieu of all other franchise, excise,
income, and corporation taxes whatsoever," not only for state but also foreign
electric cooperatives, 41 and further exempts both types from jurisdiction of
the Public Service Commission.42 It permits mortgaging or pledging fran-
chise, property, revenues and income without authorization of the members
upon such terms and conditions as the Board of Directors shall determine
to secure any indebtedness to the United States or any federal agency or
instrumentality.43 This would seem to be as rank though not as frank an
abdication to federal regulation as the Tennessee Act. The true significance
of this is brought out by a North Carolina case which enjoined, on a tax-
payer's suit, the construction of a municipal hydro-electric plant and distri-
bution system, pursuant to a resolution of the defendant city, whereby it
accepted a Federal Power Commission project license under agreement to
38 TENN. CoDE ANN. (Williams, 1934) §§ 3708.37, 3708.96.39lndiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, and
Virginia.40C. 566, effective April 29, 1942; c. 77-A Consolidated Laws. In a memorandum ex-
pressing his pleasure in approving the Act, Governor Lehman said it would make possible
formation of farmers' rural electric cooperative corporations, and would bring electric
service to 45,000 unserved farms in the state at low interest rates and on liberal financing
terms offered by the Rural Electrification Administration.
Connecticut and Maine adopted the model R.E.A. Cooperative Act, 1941.411d. § 66. By § 41, "Any foreign non-profit or cooperative corporation supplying or
authorized to supply electric energy and owning or operating electric transmission or
distribution lines in an adjacent state may construct or acquire extensions of such lines
in this state within an area no point of which is more than ten miles from the boundary
line of this state and operate such extensions, provided that," such corporation file with
the department of state a designation of the secretary of state as its agent to accept
service of process.42Id. § 67.
43Id. § 61 (a). But any other disposition or encumbering of a substantial portion of
the property of such co~perative must be approved by a majority vote at a meeting of
members. § 61 (b). Nearly all states more wisely require a vote of members for any
incumbering or other disposition of the co~perative property.
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abide by all the conditions and provisions of the Federal Power Act, as this
would vest complete control in the federal agency, which would be unlawful
in absence of special authorization by the state legislature.44 This federal aid
bait is like an insidious narcotic from which the states that rushed into the
T.V.A. program of public ownership and operation, by buying up or dupli-
cating existing private utilities, have begun to awaken only to find that they
have killed the goose that laid the golden egg of taxes necessary to support
state institutions. 45, Such wholesale tax exemption for R.E.A. cooperatives
simply shifts more of the tax load to the average home owner who pays for
general protection, whereas the R.E.A. consumers would pay but a trifle
more in price for a definite and valuable direct service. 46 If the cooperative
movement is to dominate our post-war economy, as it promises to do, it
must shoulder its share of the tax burden.
44McGuinn v. High Point, 217 N. C. 449, 8 S. E. (2d) 462, 128 A. L. R. 608 (1940).4 5This was finally recognized by the Authority and Congress. Barnes, T.V.A. Tax
Hangover (1940) 25 PUB. UTILITIEs FORTNIGHTLY 527, wherein is reproduced at p. 530,
T.V.A. Chairman Morgan's, The T.V.A.'s Position on Tax Replacements from the
CONG. REc., Jan. 4, 1940, p. 105. See Anderson, T.V.A., Some Tennessee Problems
(1940) 16 TENN. L. Rxv. 304, 307. The original T.V.A. Act of 1933, [May 18, 1933,
c. 32, § 13, 48 STAT. 66, 16 U. S. C. 831 (1)], provided that 5% of the gross proceeds
received from the sale of hydro-electric power in Alabama and Tennessee should be
available for payments in lieu of taxes. The Sparkman-Norris Act [June 26, 1940, c. 432,
§ 39, 54 STAT. 626, 16 U. S. C. 831 (b)], attempted to avoid injustice against other
states in which the Authority functions by providing for payments in lieu of taxes on
all property allocated to power, an amount equal to what would have been paid had
the property been privately owned. For an excellent statement of the problem, see
Pond, The Value and Importanwe of Exempt Real Estate in. tle United States (1940)
18 TAx MAG. 416. As to the application of the act, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEN-
NESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY (1941) pp. 22-24.
The extensive tax exemption of the New York Rural Electric Cooperative Act, and
the exemptions of acts of other states, seems to go beyond that which the R.E.A. has
been willing to defend in the face of the above experience. See R. E. A. REPORT, 1940,
p. 23; id. 1941, p. 18, where emphasis is placed upon taxation based on earning power.
In Wisconsin, by Laws 1941, c. 199, an annual license fee of 3% gross revenues
from sales to members was imposed on electric cooperative associations.4 6 1t might be well to recall in this connection, Booneville v. Maltbie, 272 N. Y. 404,
4 N. E. (2d) 209 (1936), upholding the right of a municipality owning and operating
an electric lighting plant to charge rates which would give it a fair return on the value
of property used and useful in the public service, thus acquiring a profit above bare
cost of operation for general municipal purposes with resultant reduction in the general
municipal tax.
The people of New York approved this policy by Constitutional Amendment 1938,
Art. 3, § 18 which reads: "The legislature shall pass no bill, resolution or other measure
prohibiting any municipal corporation operating a gas, electric or water public utility
service from making and receiving, in addition to an amount equivalent to taxes which
the said service, if privately owned, would pay to such municipal corporation, a fair
return on the value of the property used and useful in such public utility service, over
and above costs of operation and necessary and proper reserves, or prohibiting the
use of the profits resulting from the operation of a public utility service for the pay-
ment of expenses or obligations incurred by such municipal purposes, or prohibiting the
use of such profits for the payment of refunds to consumers."
Cf. State v. Lincoln County Power Dist. No. 1, - Nev. -, 111 P. (2d) 528 (1941);
Shirk v. Lancaster, 313 Pa. 158, 169 AtI. 557, 90 A. L. R. 688 (1933).
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Regulation of Production of Oil and Gas
The National Natural Gas Act of 1938, regulating interstate transporta-
tion and wholesale of natural gas, has been mentioned.47  The regulation of
the non-solid fuels-oil and natural gas-presents a difficult problem. As in
the solid fuel or coal field, there are two aspects to the problem: (1) produc-
tion and conservation, and (2) transportation and marketing.
Under the view prevailing prior to the National Labor Relations Board
cases that, like manufacturing, production of oil and gas was not commerce, 48
regulation of the first phase, production and conservation, was left 'to the
states. Voluntary restriction of output by the large producers and indi-
vidual state conservation statutes proved ineffective to quell the independent
over-supply and price cutting with "hot" or "contraband" oil. State regula-
tion took the form of an Interstate Oil Compact (1935) for conservation of oil
and gas. All important oil states except California and Illinois have enacted
conservation and apportionment statutes in support of the compact.49 Con-
gress cooperated at once by backing the Compact with the Connally Hot Oil
Act . 0 This act prohibited transportation in interstate commerce of "contra-
band oil," which is defined as that produced, transported or withdrawn from
storage in excess of the amounts permitted under state laws or regulations,
and authorized the President of the United StatEs to prescribe regulations
for its enforcement. He has conferred this authority upon the Secretary of
the Interior, who exercises it through the Petroleum Conservation Division
of his department. 51 The United States Supreme Court has liberall'y sup-
ported the several states and th federal government in enforcing the oil
production and conservation laws and regulations.5 2
47See supra p. 7.
48See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936), which de-
clared the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935 unconstitutional, and Hope
Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 47 Sup. Ct. 639 (1927), sustaining a West
Virginia production tax on natural gas.49Congress, as required by the U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, § 10, 9 3, approved the compact
Feb. 16, 1935. See Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas (1942) 30 CAL. L. REv. 245, 266
et seq.
5015 U. S. C. § 715 et seq.
51See this explained in United States v. Gilliland, 312 U. S. 86, at 90, 61 Sup. Ct.
518, at 521 (1941), and U. S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, Fall, 1942, p. 271. By executive
order, May 28, 1941, Secretary of the Interior Ickes was designated Petroleum Coordi-
nator for National Defense, and by letter of April 20, 1942, the President approved the
designation of the office as "Office of Petroleum Coordinator for War." U. S. GOVERN-
MENT MANUAL, Fall, 1942, p. 271.52This is exemplified by United States v. Gilliland, supra note 51, upholding the
applicability of § 35 of the Federal Criminal Code as to verified reports falsely and
fraudulently filed in purported compliance with regulations of the Secretary of the
Interior under the "Hot Oil" Act.
In aid of state regulation the court upheld an Oklahoma statute which authorized a
state commission to determine the limits of an oil pool, to divide it into appropriate
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Since the Federal Hot Oil Act operates only as to oil coming from states
having conservation and apportionment statutes, the non-compliance of Cali-
fornia and Illinois has weakened seriously the compact plan, and supplies
an excuse to the federal government to take over the whole field under the
broadened concept of interstate commerce to cover all industries which pro-
duce or manufacture goods expected ultimately to move in interstate com-
merce in the normal course of business. The courts have not hesitated to
apply the National Fair Labor Standards Act to the oil and gas industry 3
Though this system of production control obviously conflicts with the
anti-trust laws, it has been insulated against them by skillful collaboration
with Congress, such as Congressional ratification of the Interstate Oil Com-
pact, Congressional appropriations to support the gathering of market de-
mand data by the United States Bureau of Mines, and the effective enforce-
ment of state quotas by the Connally Hot Oil Act.54
It is the oil transportation field which presents the most significant recent
developments. The Hepburn Amendment of 1906 declared oil pipe lines to
be common carriers under the Interstate Commerce Act, 5 and this was up-
held in 1914 in the Pipe Line Cases.56 Aside from filing tariffs and reports
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, these lines owned and controlled
by subsidiaries of the major oil producing companies have continued much
as before, carrying only oil sold to or produced by them or by their asso-
tracts or units and to limit the number of wells per unit, even when that prohibited
a landowner from driving a well on his own land, where he was permitted a fair
share in the oil and gas produced in the wells within the unit space (10 acres). Patterson
v. Standolind Co., 305 U. S. 376, 59 Sup. Ct. 259 (1939) appeal dismissed on other
grounds.
It also has sustained a fixed barrel allowable production per well as a "reasonable
proration" to afford greater protection to the odd lot owners on the margin of the pool.
R.R. Comm. v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U. S. 570, 614, 61 Sup. Ct. 343 (1941).
The Louisiana Conservation Law of 1940, exemplifying the most modern methods of
scientific regulation will make new law in this field. See Metzger, The Administrative
Process in the Regulation of Oil and Gas Production in Louisiana (1941) 16 TULANE
L. REv. 91.
5 3See Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, - U. S. -, 63 Sup. Ct. 125 (1942),
applying the Fair Labor Standards Act in favor of employees of a rotary drilling
firm which contracted with owners or lessees of oil lands to drill holes to an agreed-
upon depth short of the oil-sand stratum, though on reaching that depth the driller
moved on and the well was completed by a "caole drilling" rig and crew. The Court
held that since some of the oil ultimately produced normally entered pipe lines for
interstate transportation, the preliminary rotary drilling constituted a "process or occu-
pation necessary to the production of oil" with the intention, expectation or belief that
any oil produced would, in part at least, move in interstate commerce. Also see Fleming
v. Rex Oil & Gas Co., 43 F. Supp. 950 (W. D. Mich. 1941) (oil pumpers), and Note
(1941) 20 TEx. L. REv. 204.
54 Comment (1942) 51 YALE L. J. 608 (Proration of Petroleum Production).
534 STAT. 584, 49 U. S. C. § 1 (1).
56234 U. S. 548, 34 Sup. Ct. 956 (1914).
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ciated corporations.5 7 There was little objection, however, for the unparal-
leled increase in the use of oil and gas led to an enterprising expansion of
the private pipe-line systems frequently anticipating our national needs, and
at prices for crude oil which would seem generally, to have been reasonable.
Up to 1939, there had been but one complaint dealt with by the Commission
relating to transportation rates and service.58 Under the comparative free-
dom of this regime, private enterprise has built up a pipe line system which
is the envy of the world and a bulwark in our national defense, not only
without a cent of cost to the government, but while actually paying tremen-
dous taxes, national, state, and local. This was the situation, when in the
face of an impending involvement in World War II, Assistant United States
Attorney-General Arnold, burst forth with a scheme to bring about divorce-
ment of oil pipe lines from the refinery-owner relation to be achieved either
by direct litigation or by Congressional action.59
The litigation argument is based on the old New Haven case, 60 decided by
Mr. Justice White a few months before the Hepburn Amendment in 1906,
which held that a railroad contracting to sell its own coal and deliver it over its
own line at a loss if the filed freight tariff was included in the cost, could
not absorb such loss as dealer; that this constituted transportation at less
than the filed rates in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, as it then
stood. The complete answer to this argument would seem to be that since
the very amendment which four months later brought the oil pipe lines under
federal regulation also introduced the Commodities Clause6' and expressly
limited it to rail carriers, the Congress thereby adopted a definite public policy
against applying the doctrine of the New Haven case, as well as the Com-
modities Clause, to this new field. This is borne out by the subsequent failure
of Congress to extend the Commodities Clause to the oil pipe lines, and
further by the fact that it did not extend the Commodities Clause to inter-
state motor carriage under the Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, nor as to
water carriers by the Transportation Act of 1940. Moreover, it inserted no
such prohibition when dealing directly with the interstate transportation of
petroleum products in the Connally Act of 1935, nor in either the Electric
Power Act of 1935 or the Natural Gas Act of 1938.
Under these circumstances, such a divorcement, if desirable, should be
572 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (1931) pp. '96 et seq.5SBlack, Oil Pipe Line Divorcement by Litigation and Legislation (1940) 25 CORNELL
L. Q. 510, 511; Sharfman, op. cit. suPra note 57 at 98.
59Black, loc. cit. supra note 58 at 511.
6ONew Haven R.R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 26 Sup. Ct.
272 (1906).06lnterstate Commerce Act § 1 (8), 49 U. S. C. § 1 (8).
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sought as it constitutionally may be, by Congressional action, for it is pri-
marily an economic and national defense problem. This discofhcerting attack
from our own government so discouraged private pipe line expansion that
in the face of the mounting threat of war Congress was compelled to intervene
and enact the National Defense Pipe Line Construction Act of July 30,
1941,63 empowering the President to aid in the bhiilding or completion of
such pipe lines for transportation of petroleum products by granting the
power of eminent domain and financial assistance to private enterprises or
governmental agencies. With that change in government attitude has come
a gratifying progress in pipe line expansion.63
Regulation of Production and Marketing of Coal
In the "hard-fuel" field, bituminous coal has been subjected to comprehen-
sive government regulation under the Commerce Clause. The Bituminous
Coal Act of 193764 is substantially the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of
1935,65 stripped of its labor provisions of maximum hours, minimum wages
and collective bargaining features which led to its being declared unconsti-
tutional in the Carter-case,66 as a regulation of production rather than com-
merce. The later Act governs producers and wholesale distributors with re-
spect to the sale and distribution of' bituminois coal by regulation of prices
and trade practices, not only in interstate commerce, but, by express adoption
of the Shreveport doctrine, also in the intrastate coal business if that tends
to undermine the interstate regulation. 67 In the light of the labor cases,
especially the Darby decision,68 there is no doubt that the original Coal Act
would now be declared constitutional. The 1937 Act has been sustained by
the United States Supreme Court 9 in spite of resort to the taxing power to
herd all the producers into the Bituminous Coal Code by granting exemption
to those who become code members from the 19Y27 % tax on the value of the
6255 STAT. 610, 15 U. S. C. Introductory note preceding § 715.63By October 1, 1941, three of these National Defense Pipe Lines had been authorized:
(1) from Baton Rouge, La., to Greensboro, N.. C., (2) St. Joe, Fla., to Chattanooga,
Tenn., and (3) South Portland, Me., through North Troy, Vt., to Montreal, Canada-
the first two gasoline lines and all built by private oil companies. June 11, 1942, the
War Production Board approved immediate construction of a 550 mile, 24 inch crude
oil pipe line from Texas to Illinois which is expected to be completed by Dec. 1, 1942.
3 VICTORY, No. 24, p. 5 (1942).
6450 STAT. 72, 15 U. S. C. §9 828 et seq.
6549 STAT. 991, 15 U. S. C. §9 801 et seq.
66298 U. S. 238, 56 Sup. Ct. 855 (1936), Notes (1936) 34 MicH. L., REv. 1167; (1936)
16 B. U. L. Rav. 922; (1936) 50 HARv. L. REv. 307.
6750 STAT. 83, 15 U. S. C. § 834.
GsSupra notes 13 and 14.69Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U. S. 381, 60 Sup. Ct. 907 (1940);
Gray v. Powell, 314 U. S. 402, 62 Sup. Ct. 326 (1941), Note (1942) 40 MicHr. L. REV.
1093.
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coal at the mine, and though the Court in the Carter case had declared the
similar 15% tax to be a coercive penalty rather than regulation. 70 Originally
enacted for but four years, the life of the Act has been extended for another
three years to April, 1943.71 The Bituminous Coal Commission which first
administered the Act has been superseded by the Bituminous Coal Division
of the Department of the Interior.72
The anthracite coal industry has been studying the possibility of similar
state or federal regulation. It has been asserted that no action has been taken
to this end, because an anthracite .cartel embracing about 98% of the oper-
ators has been established under a wage contract with the United Mine
Workers of America, and managed by a committee of operators and miners
which meets weekly with a representative of the State of Pennsylvania to
decide the amount of anthracite the market will absorb at a "fair" profit.
This overall figure is broken down into allotments to the specific mines, under
sanction of a penalty of deduction of any excess production from future
allotments, thus avoiding the evil of over-production. Economically bene-
ficient though the purpose of this device may be, it comes perilously near a
conspiracy in restraint of trade in interstate commerce in violation of the
Sherman Act.73
For the national defense, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, has been ap-
pointed by executive order, coordinator of both solid and non-solid fuels.
Last January an overall War Resources Council was established to formu-
late a definite war program for the Interior Department.74
7oSupra note 66 at 289, 310. In former Act, 15 U. S. C. § 803; in Act of 1937, 15
U. S. C. § 830 (b).
7155 STAT. 134, 15 U. S. C. 849. When the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937 was about
to expire April 27, 1941, Professor Eugene V. Rostow, in an article, Bituminous Coal
and the Public Interest (1941) 50 YALE L. j. 541, severely criticized the act, its ad-
ministration and practical effects, on the ground that it simply created a government
monopoly for benefit of both the mine owners and the miners at the consumer's expense,
and advocated that it be allowed to lapse. His colleague, Professor Walton Hamilton,
father of the ideology behind this and other New Deal experiments, vigorously objected
in a reply article, Coal and the Economy-A Demurrer (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 595,
asserting that only a regulated economy by government agency or authority can convert
"an agglomeration of operations into an articulate industry." Rostow's reply, Johider
in Demurrer (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 611, at 620, closes with the surprisingly apt quo-
tation [from ROBBINS, THE ECONOMIC BASES OF CLASS CONFLICT (1939) p. 44]: "Our
present relapse into the methods of medieval monopoly is not progress, but reaction."72 By the amendment of 1941, 55 STAT. 134, § 2, 15 U. S. C. 852, the former office of
Consumers Council of the Commission has been revived, apparently as an independent
agency under the title "Office of the Bituminous Coal Consumers Counsel."
7 3Rostow concludes "no better illustration could be found of a trade union engaged in
restraint of trade within the test of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60
Sup. Ct. 982 (1940)," Bituminous Coal aid the Public Interest (1941) 50 YALE L. J. at
543n: Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 787.
74U. S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, Fall, 1942, p. 279.
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Regulqtion of Radio Broadcasting
There has been much agitation during the past year over expansion of
federal regulation in the radio broadcasting field. Message service by wire
or wireless, technically, but quite innocently, termed "transmission of intelli-
gence" in contrast to broadcasting, has been regulated by the government
since 1910. The Federal Communications Act of 193475 brought both kinds
of service under the jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, and with unique vision included radio transmission of energy, with all
its intriguing possibilities in a United Nations' victorious post-war future.
Congress, in enacting the F.C.A. stated a policy, inevitable in view of
the nature of radio broadcasting, to assume federal control of all the channels
of interstate and foreign radio transmission in order to make available to
all the people of the United States a rapid, efficient, nation-wide and world-
wide radio communication service. 7 6 To this end it empowered the Commis-
sion to license broadcasting stations "from time to time as public convenience,
interest or necessity requires," but for not longer than three years, such
license to be for the use and not the ownership of the frequency allotted.
Most licenses have been granted for not over six months, and only within
the past two years have a few been for a year.7 7 The Supreme Court has
held that this policy is intended to make possible well-nigh unrestricted ex-
perimentation by the Commission in development of radio broadcasting. 78
In other words, one accepting a license and building up his station in reliance
thereon does so at his peril Even the lowly "HAM", whose amateur broad-
7548 STAT. 1064, 47 U. S. C. § 151 et seq. As to jurisdiction over transmission of
energy by radio, see 47 U. S. C. 88 152 (a), 153 (d).
7650 STAT. 189, §§ 1, 2; 47 U. S. C. §§ 151, 152. See symposium by experts on the
radio industry and its regulation by the government, entitled Radio: The Fifth Estate
(1935) 177 THE ANNALS, AM. ACAD. OF PoL. & Soc. SCIENCE; New Horizons in. Radio
1941, 213 id.
7747 U. S. C. 301, 307 (d), 309 (b). See Ethridge, The Government and Radio (1942)
213 THE ANNALS, Am. AcAD. OF POL. & Soc. SCIENCE, 109, 112; Fly, Regulation of
Radio Broadcasting in the Public Interest, id. at 102. Brown and Reed, loc. cit. infra,
note 80 at 255. On power of F.C.C. to deny license to compete in international radio
transmission, see Mackay Radio & Teleg. Co. v. Federal Communications Comm., et al.,
97 F. (2d) 641 (App. D. C. 1938), Note (1938) 24 CORNELL L. Q. 277; Penstone,
Meaning of Term "Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity" under Communications
Act of 1934 as Applied to Applications for Licenses to Construct New Broadcasting
Stations (1941) 9 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 873.78Federal Communications Comm. v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 60
Sup. Ct. 693 (1940). And see to like effect under the Radio Act of 1927, Federal
Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mtge. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 53 Sup. Ct. 627, 89
A. L. R. 406 (1933), sustaining withdrawal of license from two Illinois broadcasting
stations which had expended large sums in building up an admittedly satisfactory service
and conferring that frequency on a much inferior Indiana station on the ground other
good services were available in the Illinois area and the Indiana area needed more
service. The latter case was criticized in Note (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1274.
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casts may extend beyond his state or interfere with other radio communica-
tions, must procure a federal license, so that intrastate regulation by the
government is here almost complete79
The present controversy relates to the extent the Federal Communications
Commission lawfully may exercise detailed supervision over chain broad-
casting station affiliation, advertising contracts and program selection. Since
only a limited number of stations can, operate on a standard broadcast band,
the Federal Communications Commission attempts so to allocate them geo-'
graphically as to provide adequate nation-wide service. There are almost
900 broadcasting stations in the country, the greater number of which are
associated with some one of the four great networks.80
The Commission, in carrying out its mission of assuring freedom of com-
petition in the radio broadcasting field, has objected to certain terms in the
contracts between the individual stations and the networks.81 To correct
this, the Commission last year issued regulations denying licenses to stations
whose affiliate contracts: (a) were for a longer term than two years, (b)
were exclusive, (c) granted more than a limited time option, (d) did not
give right-of rejection of unsatisfactory network programs, and (e) restricted
freedom as to rates for time not required for network programs. In addition,
the regulations prohibited single ownership and control of more than one
network.8 2 How far the matter will be pushed in flagrante bello remains to
be seen.
The Federal Communications Act also imposes on the Commission the
technical duties of providing "transmission standards," that is, to adopt
engineering rules to govern types of transmitters and their operation. In
practical effect, this regulates the kind of apparatus used for radio trans-
7948 STAT. 1081, 47 U. S. C. 301 (d).
S0N.B.C. (National Broadcasting Co.), C.B.S. (Columbia Broadcasting System),
M.B.C. (Mutual Broadcasting Co.), and the new Blue Network, recently dissociated
from N.B.C. at the order of the Commission. See Brown and Reed, Regulation of Radio
Broadcasting (1932) 27 CORNELL L. Q. 249.81Especially as to duration of the contract; time option call on the local stations;
time allocation for network advertising; and exclusive tie-up contracts. See Brown and
Reed, loc. cit. supra note 80 at 251 et seq.; Hettinger and Porter, Radio Regulation:
A Case Study in Basic Policy Conflicts (1942) 221 TEE ANNALS, Am. ACAD. OF POL. &
Soc. SCIENCE, 122, 129.
82Brown and Reed, loc. cit. supra note 80, 252 et seq.; Hettinger and Porter, loc. cit.
sztpra note 81, and Note (1941) 12 AIR L. REv. 301.
The Supreme Court has held that the promulgation of these regulations by Order
of May 3, 1941, amended Oct. 11, 1941, and by the Minute of Procedure, Oct. 31, 1941
(set forth 62 Sup. Ct. at 1204-5) constituted such an order as was reviewable by suit
in equity under 47 U. S. C. § 402 (a), and the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U. S. C.
§ 47, before they actually became operative. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
United States, et al., - U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1194 (1942), Note (1942) 56 HARV. L.
REv. 121. See Miller, Legal Aspects of the Chain Broadcasting Regulations (1941)
12 Am L. REv. 293.
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mission. 83 The Commission is awake to its public responsibility in adminis-
tering this tremendous power. To that end it has guarded against an adoption
of rules which would freeze the technical development at an unsatisfactory
stage, or stifle the normal operation of competitive forces in the broad-
casting field.8 4 This is illustrated in its attitude toward the three great in-
venti6ns which feature current radio development:
(1) F.M., or frequency modulation, which improves upon our present
A.M. (amplitude modulation) by reducing station interference and static.85
It became of age May 20, 1940, when the Commission authorized its use on
a commercial basis.
(2) Television, 8 for which about the same time, the Commission refused
to adopt standards owing to the danger. of freezing technical development at
the then prevailing levels of performance. This restricted commercial, as
distinguished from experimental, television until such time as the probabili-
ties of basic research had been fairly explored. You may recall the outcry
of dictatorship which arose, but it is questionable whether, had this ruling
been otherwise, there could have been a demonstration of color television
to the public as early as September 4, 1940. The various manufacturers
would have been so engaged in market competition to sell their reception
sets, as then developed, that experimental research would have had a severe
setback.8 7
(3) Facsimile, or instantaneous and permanent broadcast recording of
printed matter. Combined with F.M. it makes possible multiplexing, that is,
the simultaneous transmission and reception of sound and facsimile broad-
casts. This latest development tried in the fire -of war undoubtedly will
return to civilian use highly perfected.88
Long before Pearl Harbor, the President wisely began to revamp the
Communications Commission for the vital part it must play in the nation at
war, and when the time came it was organized to meet the emergency.8 9
8348 STAT. 1065, 47 U. S. C. §§ 153 (b), 303 (e), 354; U. S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL,
Fall, 1942, p. 429.
84Fly, loc. cit. mupra note 77, at 104-5.8 5Craven, Radio Frontiers, 213 THE ANNALs, Am. AcAD. oF PoL. & Soc. ScIENCE
125-6 (1941); Armstrong, Frequency Modulation and Its Future Uses, id. at 153;
Hettinger, Organizing Radio's Discoveries for Use, id. at 170, 177; Brown and Reed,
loc. cit. supra note 80, at 264.S6Engstrom, Recent Developments in Television, 213 THE ANNALs, supra note 85 at
130.
87Hettinger, loc. cit. supra note 85, at 174.88Craven, Radio Frontiers, loc. cit. supra note 85; Hogan, Facsimile and Its Future
Uses, id. at 162; Hettinger, loc. cit. supra note 85, at 170, 172.89The first step was the creation by executive order of the Defense Communications
Board with Chairman Fly of the F.C.C. as chairman, and this has been renamed the
Board of War Communications. This body is assisted by a labor advisory committee
and by an industrial advisory committee, composed of leaders in their respective branches
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Regulation by "Consent Decrees"
In recent years there has arisen a new type of regulation of business by
the Anti-trust Division of the United States Department of Justice in the
form of prosecutions commonly ending in "consent decrees." 90 "The Divi-
sion apparently now requires the party consenting to the decree to offer
'constructive proposals which are in the public interest and which go beyond
what the law requires.' Through the 'concurrent use of civil and criminal
remedies,' the Division seems to contemplate a kind of enforcement through
barter, in which the defendants will submit voluntarily to greater restrictions
than could be imposed through ordinary litigation, in return for the Divi-
sion's recommendation to the proper court that criminal proceedings be
nolle prossed."91 And unbelievable as it may sound, this program was per-
sisted in despite the outbreak of war. Finally, by March 20, 1942, the con-
tinuance of these prosecutions had become so patently contrary to the
national interest and security that the President approved a joint memoran-
dum signed by the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, and by the United
States Attorney-General, and Assistant Attorney-General Arnold of the
Anti-trust Division, specifically recognizing the injurious effect of this policy.
The memorandum provided that at the request of either of the above Secre-
of the communications field. U. S. GOVERNMENT MANUAL, Fall, 1942, pp. 58, 430.90Sometimes these decrees are entered simply after a complaint brought by the gov-
ernment; again after indictment of the defendant, or in course of trial. See Katz, The
Consent Decree in Anti-trust Administration (1940) 53 HAmv. L. REV. 415.
911senbergh and Rubin, Anti-trust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees (1940) 53
HARv. L. REv. 386, 388, citing Dep't of Justice Release, May 18, 1938, Report, Att'y
Gen. 1938, 306. See also Report, Att'y Gen. 1939, at 41.
In the automobile finance cases which ended in the consent decrees recently before
the Supreme Court in the Chrysler case, infra, District Judge Geiger, presiding at the
trial in Milwaukee, Wis., courageously objected to the bludgeoning of the defendants by
pressing criminal charges while negotiations for a consent decree were proceeding and,
therefore, dismissed the grand jury before indictments had been returned.
The characteristically forceful language of Mr. Justice Holmes in an analogous situ-
ation would seem appropriate: "Any one who respects the spirit as well as the letter
of the Fourth Amendment would be loath to believe that Congress intended to authorize
on6 of its subordinate agencies to sweep all our traditions into the fire [citation], and
to direct fishing expeditions into private papers on the possibility that they may disclose
evidence of crime. . . . The investigations and complaints seem to have been only on
hearsay or suspicion-but, even if they were induced by substantial evidence under
oath, the rudimentary principles of justice that we have laid down would apply. ... "
Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 305-7, 44 Sup. Ct. 336,
337, 32 A. L. R. 786 (1924).
In Chrysler Corporation v. United States, - U. S. -, 62 Sup. Ct. 1146 (1942),
granting modification of a consent decree at the government's request over the other
party's objection, Justices Frankfurter and Reed dissented. Cf. United States v. Radio
Corp. of America, 46 Fed. Supp. 654 (D. C. Del. 1942), refusing on the basis of the
dissent in the Chrysler case to modify or vacate such a decree solely upon the Attorney
General's statement that it no longer served the public interest, and asserting the terms
of such decrees bound the government as well as the defendant.
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taries "stating that in his opinion the investigation, suit, or prosecution will
seriously interfere with the war effort," such investigations or prosecutions
should be suspended so long as they might interfere with war production, if no
actual fraud upon the government was involved . 2  After considerable diffi-
culty and delay, a number of such stay or suspension orders have been granted
by the federal district courts, but, strangely, usually upon the joint recom-
mendation of both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.93
Pursuant to a provision in this memorandum, Congress was requested to,
and did, enact the recent statute suspending the running of the statute of
limitations on violations of the anti-trust laws until June 30, 1945, 91 or until
such earlier time as Congress by concurrent resolutions, or the President,
may designate. Indeed, Congress went even further, and provided that when-
ever, after consultation -with the Attorney General, the Chairman of the War
Production Board finds and certifies in writing that the doing or omitting
to do any act or thing in compliance with his written request or approval is
requisite to the prosecution of the war, no prosecution or civil action shall
be commenced with reference thereto under the anti-trust laws, or the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 95 Notwithstanding these sensible and patriotic meas-
ures, the national government as late as the autumn of 1942, bewildered the
public by instituting and pressing an anti-trust suit against the Associated
Press, oldest and most extensive of our news gathering agencies.", The
Associated Press was simply carrying on its business as it had done, and as
had been regarded as legal, 97 for the entire fifty years of the Sherman Act,
92 The memorandum and the President's written approval appear in 10 U. S. LAW
WEEK, § 2, pp. 2621-2622, Mar. 31, 1942.3For instances of such stays or suspensions, see, 10 U. S. LAW WEEx, § 2, pp. 2720,
2867 (1942) ; 11 U. S. LAw WEEK, § 2, pp. 2108, 2204.
O4Approved Oct. 10, 1942, c. 589, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., U. S. Code Congressional
Service, 1942, No. 9, p. 1219.
See Congressional Comment, id. at 1527, stating: "The date is selected because it is
6 months after December 31, 1944, which has been used by Congress as the estimated
date of the termination of the war and it is felt that the suspension should continue
6 months after termination of the war."
95 Act for Mobilization of Small Business Concerns in War Production, Public L.
603, c. 404, § 12, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (approved June 11, 1942). See 10 U. S. LAW
WEEK, (Statute Section) June 9, 1942, p. 4 for text. The Attorney General must report
operations under the statute to Congress every 120 days, and certificates of the W.P.B.
Chairman are to be published in the Federal Register.
96The complaint was filed in U. S. District Court, Southern Dist. of N. Y., and
charged that the by-laws of the Associated Press excluding from membership com-
petitors of existing members, and requiring member papers to furnish local news exclu-
sively to it, illegally restrained and monopolized interstate commerce in news; to which
was added a further charge of acquisition by the A.P. of the stock of Wide World
Photos, Inc., a competing news-picture service. 11 U. S. LAW WEEK, § 2, p. 2203
(Sept. 15, 1942).
See The Press in the Contemporary Scene (1942) 219 Tna ANNALs, At. AcAD. oF
POL. & Soc. SCIENCE; Siebert, Legal Developments Affecting the Press, id. at 93.
97That such a news gathering and distributing agency is not a public utility owing
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and there was no charge of defrauding the government; therefore, why such
an attack in the midst of war and contrary to the distinct policy of Congress
expressed in the above acts? Indeed, the case would seem to fall directly
within the mischief denounced by the joint memorandum that, "In the present
all-out effort to produce quickly and uninterruptedly a maximum amount of
weapons of warfare, such court investigations, suits, and prosecutions un-
avoidably consume the time of executives and employees of those corpora-
tions which are engaged in war work. In those cases we believe that con-
tinuing such prosecutions at this time will be contrary to the national interest
and security. It is therefore something which we seek to obviate as quickly
as possible." 98 Surely the world-wide, rapid and accurate garnering of in-
formation for our government and our people may be fairly classed as an
essential weapon of modern warfare, and it would seem the patriotic duty
of the Department of Justice to secure a stay of such proceedings on its own
initiative. Instead, the Court denied the defendant's motion for a stay.
Conclusion
Looking back over this survey, the outstanding feature is that the steady
advance of federal regulation of business continues beneath the surface of
emergency war-power measures. Every citizen should keep in mind the
protective values of peacetime constitutional limitations, and be alert to secure
their observance as soon as possible after attainment of a victorious peace.
No truth has been more clearly demonstrated in the history of all nations
than the deadening paralysis of over-concentration of political rule, coupled
with economic domination of business enterprise, and thereby, too, of employ-
ment. That way lies economic-power politics, which has always spelled
bloody politics-only those in power eat. Can an America so centralized
escape the very fate from which it now seeks to deliver other nations, and
become the one shining exception, on the pages of history?
a duty to serve all papers on demand was long ago held: State v. Associated Press, 159
Mo. 410, 60 S. W. 91, 51 L. R. A. 151, 81 Am. St. Rep. 368 (1901); Matthews v.
Associated Press, 136 N. Y. 333, 32 N. E. 981 (1893). And see International News
Service v. The Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 2 A. L. R. 293 (1918) ;
Thorp & Annette v. General News Bureau, Inc., 242 App. Div. 330, 275 N. Y. Supp. 41(1st Dep't 1934). Contra: Inter-Ocean Pub. Co. v. Associated Press, 184 Ill. 438, 56
N. E. 822, 48 L. R. A. 568, 75 Am. St. Rep. 184 (1900).
.9810 U. S. LAw W EK, § 2, p. 2621 (Mar. 31, 1942).
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